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In 1989 the Australian government introduced the first university tuition-loan 
program in which debts would be collected through the income tax system 
depending on the participant's income. 1 The policy, known as the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) is an arrangement known as an 
income contingent loan (!CL), a debt that differs critically from 'normal' 
loans in that repayments occur if and only when debtors' incomes reach a 
given level. Eight other countries have since adopted similar student loan 
schemes and, at the time of writing, there is a Bill (the Earnings Contingent 
Education Loans (ExCEL) Act) under bi-partisan consideration in the US 
Congress which, if passed, would have the effect of introducing a broadly-
based ICL. It is generally agreed that !CL policies for higher education 
financing have worked effectively from the perspective of equity and 
efficiency, and from a transactional perspective. 
While HECS was considered to be a creative innovation, applauded in the 
main for its political sophistication, no-one at the time foresaw the potential of 
ICL to transform the debate concerning the economic and social policy 
landscape. There was no appreciation of the possibility that contingent loan 
financing could provide a model for far-reaching renovations to the nature and 
form of public policy; yet in the eyes of some contemporary social scientists 
such a possibility is close to being realised. The ICL potential, and the 
intellectual, conceptual and empirical bases of contingent financing, are the 
subjects of our book. 
Over about the last 25 years economists and other social scientists have 
taken the basic template of Australia's education ICL and applied it to a 
plethora of different social and economic arenas. It is this policy and research 
experience that provided the idea of holding an International Economics 
Association workshop on the broad topic ofICL, and this came to frnition at 
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Dhurakij Pundit University (DPU) in Bangkok in April 2013. The convenors 
were Professors Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce Chapman, with critical fonding 
support provided by DPU, the Australian Research Council and Ausaid, the 
Australian government aid agency at the time. 
The two-day workshop covered: the conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings of ICL; the costs and benefits of different types of higher 
education student loans; and potential contingent loan policy applications 
beyond higher education. A number of participants presented commentary 
during and after the workshop, sunnnarising their thoughts on the discussion, 
and examining, among other things, advantages and disadvantages of 
particular features of different ICL programs, lessons learned, unresolved 
questions, and fnture prospects and challenges. 
This volume contains revised versions of the presentations and 
commentaries presented at the workshop. 
In the first chapter following this introduction, Chapman sets the scene by 
traversing the major theoretical and policy issues in historical, conceptual and 
empirical contexts. The chapter is intended to introduce ICL to readers 
unfamiliar both with loans of this form and with the literature analysing these 
programs. 
The remainder of the book consists of four sections. Section I examines the 
theoretical underpinnings of ICL. Section 2 describes and considers critically 
the application of !CL in higher education, and includes an overview of the 
motivation, design, and lessons learned from the implementation of ICL 
schemes for higher education. Various case studies (Chile, Colombia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Germany) illustrate a variety of issues that higher 
education financing programs face, and the possibility for solutions through 
ICL. 
Section 3 provides an examination of several disparate potential 
applications of !CL in financing areas well beyond student loans, including: 
paid parental leave; legal aid; business innovation; health care; sustaining 
consumption dnring a period of unemployment; and providing for aged care. 
It also contains a discussion of the internationalisation of !CL debt payments 
for human capital trade imbalances. Section 4 concludes with commentaries 
on aspects of ICL theory, design and application, ranging from a reassessment 
of the costs and benefits of ICL in higher education, to reflections on 
contingent loans as a new paradigm for the welfare state and as a lower cost 
alternative to private financial markets in certain critical reahns. 
Following are brief summaries of the chapters, and what we consider to be 
the key findings from the workshop. 
In Chapter I, Chapman highlights the critical advantages of !CL over 
conventional loans: it provides for better consumption smoothing, since with 
ICL repayment obligations are a fixed proportion of income; the 
administrative and compliance costs with !CL have been low; government has 
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the legal power to collect from income; and, in countries with universal and 
transparent internal revenue services (or taxation offices), the transactional 
efficiency of these systems can lead to significant cost advantages ofICL over 
other financing instruments. This last point is raised by Stiglitz in Chapter 2, 
and by Deillliss in the volume's final chapter. While focusing on the 
Australian experience, Chapman goes on to briefly sUllilllarize the 
international experience with ICL. Chapman stresses that the viability of ICL 
requires a strong legal framework, a universal and transparent regime of 
income taxation and/or social security collection, and an efficient repayment 
mechanism. This point is also emphasized by Sahni (Chapter 6) in discussions 
of student loans in Chile and Colombia, and by Hock-Earn, Ismail and 
Ibraliinl (Chapter 7) with respect to Malaysia. 
In the second part of Chapter 1, Chapman examines some major conceptual 
issues related to the application of ICL to disparate policy areas beyond higher 
education. The policy benefits essentially take the form of insurance against 
consumption hardship (and concomitantly, loan default), but there is a major 
and pervasive issue inherent in the design of all ICL, which concerns the 
possibilities of non-repayment of the loan. Related problems are adverse 
selection - the risk that only individuals who anticipate having a low income 
will sign up for the program - and moral hazard - the risk that income 
contingent loans will attenuate incentives. These concepts and their relevance 
to the use of ICL as a government risk-management instrument are examined 
in detail. 
In the first chapter in Section 1, the broad theoretical consideration ofICL, 
Stiglitz compares and contrasts the economic consequences of debt and equity. 
In financing human capital, ICL has distinct advantages in risk sharing, 
analogous to that of equity in fmancing conventional investments. He also 
highlights the issue of 'transactional efficiencies' and makes a strong case that 
governments are particularly well-placed to be engaged in financial 
intervention in many areas of economic behavior because the use of the 
internal revenue service as a loan collection agency is an extremely efficient, 
as well as equitable, way to collect debt. The point is taken up enthusiastically 
and expanded in the fmal volume chapter by Deillliss. 
In Chapter 3, Quiggin presents a simple model of income contingent loans. 
His model illustrates how ICLs allow for insurance against wage (and more 
generally, income) uncertainty and shows that under reasonable conditions, an 
!CL is superior to market loans or tax-financed public subsidies in terms of 
both labor market efficiency and equity. Quiggin argues that if individuals 
expect to repay the full ICL with certainty, then there will not be distortions to 
labor supply. Rather, he points out that distortions will only occur in the wage 
interval where optimal effort leads to partial loan repayment. This raises the 
important question as to the size of the wage interval for which adverse 
effects on labor supply arise, a question Racionero poses in Chapter 19. 
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Long adds to the debate in Chapter 4, providing a conceptnal model for 
measuring social welfare gains for an ICL utilizing a flexible piecewise linear 
repayment scheme. Under the proposed model, ICL scheme parameters could, 
in theory, be selected by optimizing the social welfare function subject to 
known distributions of labor productivities and elasticities of labor supply, 
and appropriate equity constraints. Starting with the modeling of simple 
systems and interactions is a practical and sensible approach, and a marked 
improvement over a simple linear repayment scheme. Long, like Stiglitz and 
Yun (Chapter 16), suggest that a general theory for ICLs has to be embedded 
in the broader context of taxation, welfare and social security, and his paper 
can be viewed as a necessary step along the path to developing such a theory. 
Long shows that an ICL contributes toward consumption smoothing across 
states of nature (or individual types) within any period, as well as across 
periods. He argues in favour of a scheme of piecewise linear income-
dependent repayment rates, which is a dynamic generalization of the scheme 
of piecewise linear income taxation that Apps, Long and Rees (2012) 
investigated in a static setting. 
Section 2 focuses on ICL developments in higher education, where they 
have had their widest application. Chapter 5 begins with Barr's 
comprehensive coverage of the debate on higher education funding, and is an 
important complement to Chapman's background paper. Barr first provides 
the context, namely that higher education has changed and that the expansion 
of the sector requires new approaches to financing. He surmnarises the 
argmnents for cost-sharing based on fiscal constraints, equity, and efficiency, 
and concludes that the only 'large-scale equitable source of private finance' is 
through graduate futnre earnings (p.65), that is, through a c0ntingent system 
ofloans. 
Barr highlights the issue of interest rates, arguing strongly against blanket 
interest subsidies in ICL programs, on the grounds that they are expensive and 
poorly targeted, particularly if debt forgiveness already protects graduates 
with low lifetime earnings. A consequence of high real interest rates is the 
possibility of spiralling nominal debt, and Barr presents some solutions, such 
as applying zero real rates when repayments fall short of accrued interest. 
Barr then shares lessons about loan design and implementation in the UK, 
New Zealand, and Hungary. Of particular interest is the case of Hungary, 
where loans are financed by the private sector with repayments based on past 
earnings, and an interest rate is charged that is the sum of the cost of finance, 
a cohort risk premimn (to cover the risk of non-repayment), and 
administrative charges. The essential point is that with careful design, ICL 
loans can be privately financed. The Hungarian approach essentially moves 
the risk from the taxpayer to the cohort of graduates (see Racionero, Chapter 
19, for further discussion of this point). 
Barr's point that th 
contingency is a mec 
what sets income cc 
policies. In this conteJ 
of the mechanism arn 
the tax authorities'. Th 
in the Workshop, and 
and Denniss (see Chai: 
In Chapter 6 Salmi 
experience in Chile an 
hardship, if loans are : 
repayment burdens anc 
the Chilean loan s 
government announce1 
the new administratior 
higher education. Sain 
education could be a b 
eqnity of higher educa1 
funds to higher educa 
come from higher inco 
His chapter explains 1 
'loans, has also faced i: 
and increased public 
approach, partly due t< 
system in the presence 
a key lesson raised 1 
challenge is having a re 
While Malaysia has c 
education is currently f 
In Chapter 7, Hock-Ea 
financing arrangemen1 
repayment burdens of 
debtor's income that is 
for a significant minor 
repayment burdens, ev< 
costs of the course an< 
education qualification: 
demonstrates that an I< 
than under existing , 
repayment burdens. De 
students and govemme 
challenge of collection i 
itual model for 
)iecewise linear 
trameters could, 
;tion subject to 
if labor supply, 
,ling of simple 
,, and a marked 
like Stiglitz and 
to be embedded 
y, and his paper 
g such a theory. 
noothing across 
: well as across 
linear inco1ne-
n of the scheme 
1d Rees (2012) 
:ion, where they 
ts with Barr's 
mding, and is an 
m first provides 
mt the expansion 
summarises the 
r, and efficiency, 
rivate finance' is 
ontingent system 
y against blanket 
rre expensive and 
rotects graduates 
:erest rates is the 
ie solutions, such 
accrued interest. 
:ation in the UK, 
case of Hungary, 
mts based on past 
te cost of finance, 
repayment), and 
reful design, ICL 
essentially moves 
acionero, Chapter 
Introduction and Summa1y 5 
Barr's point that there is no single income contingent scheme - 'income 
contingency is a mechanism for collecting repayments' (p.69) - highlights 
what sets income contingent loans and graduate taxes apart from other 
policies. In this context two features of ICL are special: the built-in insurance 
of the mechanism, and its transactional efficiency when collection is through 
the tax authorities. The transactional efficiency of ICL was a recurring theme 
in the Workshop, and one that is argued in depth by both Stiglitz (Chapter 2) 
and Denniss (see Chapter 22). 
In Chapter 6 Salmi recounts lessons from the recent student loan policy 
experience in Chile and Colombia. His key lesson is that in times of economic 
hardship, if loans are not income contingent graduates will face considerable 
repayment burdens and very high loan default rates. This led to the collapse of 
the Chilean loan system following recent student protests. Despite 
government announcements to move to an ICL arrangement for all students, 
the new administration has since promised to abolish fees and introdnce free 
higher education. Sahni stresses that if implemented, so-called 'free' higher 
education could be a backward step and potentially jeopardize the quality and 
equity of higher educ.ation in Chile: budget constraints limit the availability of 
fi.mds to higher education, and a disproportionate share of the beneficiaries 
come from higher income families and/or end up as higher income individuals. 
His chapter explains that Colombia, the first country to introduce student 
loans, has also faced pressure from student protests for the abolition of fees 
and increased public fi.mding, and has resisted moves to adopt an ICL 
approach, partly due to difficulties in repayment collections through the tax 
system in the presence of a large informal sector and fiscal fraud. Reiterating 
a key lesson raised by Chapman in Chapter 1, Salmi stresses that the 
challenge is having a reasonably fool-proof collection mechanism. 
While Malaysia has considered implementation of an ICL in the past, higher 
education is currently financed through highly subsidised mortgage-type loans. 
In Chapter 7, Hock-Earn, Ismail, and Ibrahim critically examine the existing 
financing arrangements. They focus on empirical evidence related to 
repayment burdens of mortgage-type loans, which is the proportion of a 
debtor's income that is required to repay typical student debts. It is clear that 
for a significant minority of Malaysian graduates there are worryingly high 
repayment burdens, even though the current scheme does not cover the full 
costs of the course and has subsidies of over 50 per cent for some higher 
education qualifications (such as for sciences and medicine). The chapter 
demonstrates that an ICL could yield subsidies that are considerably lower 
than under existing arrangements, and be associated with manageable 
repayment burdens. Despite the equity and affordability of ICLs (both for 
students and government), the authors are careful to stress the muesolved 
challenge of collection in the Malaysian institutional and political context. 
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In Chapter 8, Lounkaew contributes to the student loan literature by 
providing empirical evidence of the trade-off between interest rate subsidies 
and expected aggregate loan recovery. In particular, the paper explores the 
potential impact of eliminating the interest rate subsidies of Thailand's 
Student Loans Fund (SLF). Three important policy conclusions can be drawn. 
First, in the absence of interest rate subsidies, which are currently of the order 
of around 60 per cent, the repayment burdens for a large number of debtors 
would be extremely high. Second, it is shown that attempting to solve the high 
interest rate costs problem by setting the real rate of interest to 3 per cent 
would result in default rates of close to 50 per cent, implying very large 
subsidies of this kind for taxpayers. Third, the current design of the SLF -
which is a mortgage-based loan system - does not allow for consumption 
smoothing, an important issue given the significant variations in graduate 
incomes over the life-cycle. 
The final paper (Chapter 9) in this section, by Grave and Sinning, describes 
the loan scheme used in Germany for financing student living expenses, 
known as the BAfdG scheme. Subsidies in the scheme can be as high as 80 
per cent. Consequently they suggest that the scheme could arguably be 
replaced by grants, which could be more cost-effective for the goverrunent 
when administrative savings are taken into consideration. Grave and Sinning 
go on to show that under the current loan arrangements, high subsidies are 
required to offset the high repayment burdens or long repayment durations 
that students would otherwise face in the absence of subsidization. There is an 
alternative, however, to grants or high subsidies; they show how a properly 
designed ICL can provide an attractive and much less expensive alternative. 
Part 3 of the volume explores the prospects for ICL beyond financing higher 
education. Many examples are motivated by capital market failures -
individuals typically can't get loans, let alone income contingent loans, to 
finance the items in question. The applications that have received most focus 
are those in which it is considered that there are clear externalities; there are 
broader social concerns surrounding the individnals being able to obtain the 
good or service in question. In all possible extensions of ICL it is 
acknowledged that poorly designed arrangements can be associated with 
substantial costs as a result of adverse selection and moral hazard, a prospect 
writ large when there is not universal compulsion to participate in the scheme 
(which is true of all the schemes discussed in this section). 
In the first contribution (Chapter 10) Higgins discusses the application of an 
ICL to help finance parental leave. He argues that paid parental leave is an 
investment in human capital as it fosters workforce retention, and a lack of 
collateral for young parents leads to liquidity constraints. As with higher 
education there is a market failure due to asymmetric information concerning 
future work intentions and prospects. Adverse incentive and selection effects 
can be mitigated through scheme design, which could include limiting the 
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dirration of the leave, making the debt an obligation of both parents, and 
restricting eligibility to the paid labor force. 
Clarke and Chapman, in Chapter 11, examine the issue of the international 
emigration of skilled workers from less developed countries to economically 
advantaged nations, a process that can be described as highly regressive. The 
chapter examines the viability of a proposal to make operational Bhagwati's 
'brain drain tax'. The basic idea is that emigrating graduates would be 
required to repay to their original coirntry debts for higher education and these 
would be collected in the same way as ICL debts are for domestic students. 
Chapter 12, by Denniss, considers the development of an ICL scheme for 
legal aid for civil disputes in Australia. Delrlliss presents evidence that cost is 
the main reason for the lmmet demand for legal services, and he outlines a 
Legal Expenses Contribution Scheme as a financing instrument. Importantly, 
to mitigate the risk of adverse selection, cases would be subject to a merit test 
prior to consideration for funding. Delrlliss argues that an appropriately 
desigued scheme could help to meet the demand for legal services, while 
encoirraging equity by striking a balance between the retention of personal 
risk in order to limit ulfllecessary legal action, and protection against poverty 
through imposition of a minimum income threshold. 
Gupta and Withers follow in Chapter 13 with an ICL arrangement for the 
financing of business inmovation. Small and medium-sized enterprises are 
often precluded from funding soirrces available to larger enterprises due to 
lack of expertise, size constraints, and generally limited capacity for risk. The 
lack of access to finance represents a market failirre, and the authors suggest a 
scheme that would include a default-protected contingent loan mechanism 
with repayments from net earnings. Because repayments would be required 
only when the finns' circumstances are financially propitious, this would 
ensirre that the scheme provides revenue or profit smoothing. As with other 
examples in Section 3, the authors note the importance of limiting adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and propose a training requirement and 
commercial assessment in partnership with government and financial 
institutions. A (partial) risk-pooling arrangement is proposed, such that 
successful firms repay, in present value terms, more than they borrow (which 
is, of coirrse, always a feature of non-subsidized income contingent loan 
programs), thus adding an 'important mutnal responsibility dimension' 
(p.162), but also partial taxpayer subsidization is argued for on the grounds of 
social pay-off from the opportunities generated from ilfllovation activities. 
In Chapter 14, Vaithianathan considers how ICLs could be used in health 
care, in particular for the funding of out-of-pocket health care expenditure in 
specific areas where there seem to be substantial needs and benefits from the 
increased access to health care that such a scheme would provide. She notes 
the potential for significant efficiency gains from such a program. Her 
analysis begins by pointing out that in high income coirntries, despite 
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widespread health insurance, some services such as psychological therapies 
for depression are not funded despite depression being a major cause of 
disability and exit from work. It is suggested that ICLs may offer an 
opportunity for those who face potentially high returns from investing in 
health but are cash-constrained form doing so, and where conventional health 
insurance systems cannot fully overcome the adverse and moral hazard 
problems. 
In Chapter 15, Chomik and Piggott expand on the concept of 'contingency' 
beyond income to resources more broadly in the context of support policies 
for the elderly. They demonstrate the similarities between JCLs and existing 
public age pensions and reverse mortgage products, which one might broadly 
classify as resource contingent instruments, and they stress the importance of 
such policies in light of the fiscal pressures on the state associated with an 
ageing population. 
The final paper in Section 3 (Chapter 16), by Stiglitz and Yun, explores the 
potential use of JCLs in the context of unemployment insurance. Episodes of 
unemployment can cause serious hardship, even if the loss of lifetime income 
is limited, because of imperfections of capital markets. Loans enable 
individuals to smooth consumption over time, without some of the adverse 
incentive effects (on search) associated with unemployment insurance. But 
unemployment loans run into difficulties when individuals face successive 
bouts of unemployment. Conventional loans can leave individuals in hardship 
later in life. JCLs are a solution to this quandary, providing better incentives 
than ordinary unemployment insurance, but better risk sharing than a 
conventional loan. They show that there are complex externalities, across 
periods and instruments, with the unemployment program in one period 
affecting search behavior in other periods. These externalities have to be taken 
into account in designing the optimal unemployment program. They show that 
in general, the mix of loans and insurance and the terms of the JCLs should 
vary over the individual's life and depend on his or her work experience. 
The final section of the book includes commentaries from several 
participants on a number of different !CL areas. While the workshop focus 
was on !CL, in Chapter 17 Palacios describes the benefits and costs of income 
contingent financing more broadly, to include human capital contracts and 
graduate taxes. Palacios describes the involvement of the private sector as 
providers of human capital contracts, which are privately underwritten income 
contingent contracts that are a form of equity rather than debt finance. His 
major contribution is beyond the comparison of these different contingent 
arrangements and lies in the argument that the costs imposed by adverse 
selection and moral hazard may not be as critical as generally perceived, and 
that such products might provide important price signals to students, 
government, and higher education providers as to the value of human capital. 
Chapter 18 from 
types of governm1 
Yun describes the 
efficiency and equ 
for low-income far 
In Chapter 19, R 
debate covered du 
the options for !Cl 
borne by taxpaye 
responsible for co· 
and the theoretical 
in the presence of r 
application of ICL 
moral hazard and ' 
also expresses cone 
simultaneously om 
finance' literature 
development of ICI 
address the probler 
the possibility of m 
In Chapter 20, Q1 
to be adopted in po 
proposition is that ' 
groups will general 
in many cases we 
receipt of grant as: 
countries, the finan 
financial products. 
one of the significai 
through the tax serv 
the financial sector 
taken up further by 
Withers pursues 1 
Chapter 21. He su> 
additional new di1 
promising way to id 
analysis of the role c 
Throughout the " 
values associated v 
transaction and coll 
system offer considc 
such loans to smoc 
contingencies. A pe 
igical therapies 
major cause of 
may offer an 
1m investing in 
ventional health 
l moral hazard 
>f 'contingency' 
support policies 
:Ls and existing 
e might broadly 
.e importance of 
:ociated with an 
un, explores the 
1ce. Episodes of 
lifetime income 
. Loans enable 
~ of the adverse 
t insurance. But 
face successive 
luals in hardship 
better incentives 
sharing than a 
~malities, across 
i in one period 
have to be taken 
1. They show that 
the ICLs should 
experience. 
,s from several 
workshop focus 
i costs of income 
ta! contracts and 
private sector as 
lerwritten income 
debt finance. His 
ferent contingent 
>osed by adverse 
ly perceived, and 
mis to students, 
,f hunian capital. 
Introduction and Summary 9 
Chapter 18 from Yun outlines welfare effects ofICL as compared to other 
types of government aid program such as mortgage-type loans and grants. 
Yun describes the Korean student loan program, and discusses the potential 
efficiency and equity aspects of two-tier loan systems that consist of an ICL 
for low-income families and mortgage-type loans for other income groups. 
In Chapter 19, Racionero provides a considered sununary of many points of 
debate covered during the workshop. Among other matters, she sunnnarizes 
the options for ICL design (risk-sharing, where the cost of non-repayment is 
borne by taxpayers, versus risk-pooling, where successful graduates are 
responsible for covering the repayment shortfall of low earning graduates); 
and the theoretical work on scheme design selection for optimal participation 
in the presence of risk aversion. Racionero also discusses issues relating to the 
application of ICLs beyond higher education, reiterating the significance of 
moral hazard and adverse selection as critical in scheme design. Her chapter 
also expresses concern over the accumulation of ICL debt if multiple ICLs are 
simultaneously offered, and refers to contributions in the 'new dynamic public 
fmance' literature that may provide lessons and guidance for further 
development ofICL theory. Of note, Stiglitz and Yun (Chapter 16) explicitly 
address the problem of multiple loans in the context of an individual facing 
the possibility of multiple bouts of unemployment. 
In Chapter 20, Quiggin poses the interesting question of why ICLs have yet 
to be adopted in policy areas outside of higher education fmancing. His basic 
proposition is that while the conceptual case for ICL is strong, special interest 
groups will generally have the political muscle to resist policy changes which 
in many cases would reduce financial privileges of citizens currently in 
receipt of grant assistance. In the United States and many other advanced 
countries, the financial sector has been an impediment to the design of better 
financial products. As a number of papers in this volume have emphasized, 
one of the significant advantages ofICL is collection of payment/enforcement 
through the tax services. However, greater adoption ofICL is likely to cut out 
the financial sector from the large rents that they currently receive (the issue is 
taken up further by Denniss in the final chapter of the volume). 
Withers pursues the issues of ICL in rational individual choice theory in 
Chapter 21. He suggests that there are also complementary possibilities for 
additional new directions for ICL theory and research. An especially 
promising way to identify such sectors is through a positive political economy 
analysis of the role of voters, politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups. 
Throughout the workshop there was robust discussion on the benefits and 
values associated with the features of ICL. It was argued that the lower 
transaction and collection costs of government through the income taxation 
system offer considerable untapped opportunities that go beyond the ability of 
such loans to smooth consumption across time and over different income 
contingencies. A persuasive argunient on these lines is presented in Chapter 
I 0 Brnce Chapman, Timothy Higgins and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
22 by Denniss. As the lower costs can be passed on to borrowers (whether 
through scheme benefits such as insurance, or because charges are lower than 
they are for private sector loans), an ICL is welfare enhancing, and on this 
basis an argument can be put forward for goverrnnent intervention in all areas 
where there is a case for intertemporal and interstate smoothing (across 
contingencies that affect individuals' lifetime well-being), essentially 
implying an alternative welfare state to the contemporary system. The 
argument is strongly consistent with the benefits highlighted by Stiglitz in 
Chapter 2 on the issue of ICL transactional efficiencies. This represents a 
major departure from the direction bein~ taken in many countries, entailing 
greater reliance on private sector lending. 
A key message from the contributions in this vohnne is that there appears to 
be a critical potential for the use of ICL instruments not only in higher 
education, but in many other areas. And the opportunity for welfare gain from 
lower cost government administration and collection (in countries with 
appropriate institutions) suggests that consideration be extended for 
contingent loans even when capital markets are functioning (albeit with higher 
transactions costs). 
The papers in this volume have noted that there are critical matters of design, 
most obviously motivated by the need to maximize ICL debt recovery, 
addressing adverse selection and moral hazard concerns, which often loom 
large. Many of the examples in this volume have shown how these issues of 
design can be, and have been, addressed. The considerable transactional 
efficiencies associated with government intervention of these forms, 
combined with the improvements in risk and incentives that well-designed 
ICL programs can provide, suggests that such programs can play an important 
role in a modem welfare state. 
Of course it should be acknowledged that policy change is difficult even 
when there is a clear case for reform on economic grounds. In the event of 
vested interests and generous benefit payments, barriers to reform can be great. 
A more widespread embrace ofICL requires careful framing of the benefits to 
the public, politicians and to policy makers. The strong potential for welfare 
gains suggests that this is a challenge well worth pursuing, and especially so 
at times such as these when so many countries are facing severe fiscal issues. 
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1. Yale University had introduced an income contingent loan program some years earlier 
but there were two critical distinctions (highlighted in the paper by Nerlove (1975)): in 
the Australian program the debts were collected by the tax authorities, enhancing 
enforcement and lowering transactions costs; and because all students participated in 
the program, 1 
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the program, the adverse selection problem which plagued the Yale program did not 
arise. 
2. Note that the U.S. finally recognized the extra burden associated with private financial 
markets, moving in 2010 to a public higher education program that relied exclusively 
on direct loans from the govenunent rather than subsidies to private banks, This 
measure will save approximately $68 billion from 2010 to 2020. However, the U.S. has 
not yet moved to an income contingent loan program. 
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